On the Deterministic Sum-Capacity of the Multiple Access Wiretap Channel by Fritschek, Rick & Wunder, Gerhard
On the Deterministic Sum-Capacity of the Multiple
Access Wiretap Channel
Rick Fritschek
Heisenberg Communications and Information Theory Group
Freie Universität Berlin,
Takustr. 9, D–14195 Berlin, Germany
Email: rick.fritschek@fu-berlin.de
Gerhard Wunder
Heisenberg Communications and Information Theory Group
Freie Universität Berlin,
Takustr. 9, D–14195 Berlin, Germany
Email: wunder@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Abstract—We study a deterministic approximation of the
two-user multiple access wiretap channel. This approximation
enables results beyond the recently shown 2
3
secure degrees of
freedom (s.d.o.f.) for the Gaussian multiple access channel. While
the s.d.o.f. were obtained by real interference alignment, our
approach uses signal-scale alignment. We show an achievable
scheme which is independent of the rationality of the channel
gains. Moreover, our result can differentiate between channel
strengths, in particular between both users, and establishes a
secrecy rate dependent on this difference. We can show that the
resulting achievable secrecy rate tends to the s.d.o.f. for vanishing
channel gain differences. Moreover, we extend the s.d.o.f. bound
towards a general bound for varying channel strengths and show
that our achievable scheme reaches the bound for certain channel
gain parameters. We believe that our analysis is the first step
towards a constant-gap analysis of the Gaussian multiple access
wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study the secure capacity of an approx-
imation of the Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel.
The wiretap channel was first proposed by Wyner in [1],
and solved in its degraded version. The result was later
extended to the general wiretap channel by Csiszar and Körner
in [2]. Moreover, the Gaussian equivalent was studied by
Leung-Yan-Cheon and Hellman in [3]. The wiretap channel
and its modified version served as an archetypical channel
for physical-layer security investigations. However, in recent
years, the network nature of communication, i.e. support of
multiple users, becomes increasingly important. A straight-
forward extension of the wiretap channel to multiple users
was done in [4], where the Gaussian multiple access wiretap
channel (GMAC-WT) was introduced. A general solution for
the secure capacity of this multi-user wiretap set-up was out
of reach and investigations focused on the secure degrees of
freedom (s.d.of.) of these networks. Degrees of freedom are
used to gain insights into the scaling behaviour of multi-
user channels. They measure the capacity of the network,
normalized by the single-link capacity, as power goes to
infinity. This also means that the d.o.f. provide an asymptotic
view on the problem at hand. This simplifies the analysis
and enables asymptotic solutions of channel models where
no finite power capacity results could be found. An example
for a technique which yields d.o.f. results is real interference
alignment. It uses integer lattice transmit constellations which
are scaled such that alignment can be achieved. The intended
messages are recovered by minimum-distance decoding and
the error probability is bounded by usage of the Khintchine-
Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation theory. The
disadvantage of the method is that these results only hold
for almost all channel gains. This is unsatisfying for se-
crecy purposes, since it leaves an infinite amount of cases
where the schemes do not work, e.g. rational channel gains.
Moreover, secrecy should not depend on the accuracy of
channel measurements. Real interference alignment is part of a
broader class of interference alignment strategies. Interference
alignment (IA) was introduced in [5] and [6], among others,
and its main idea is to design signals such that the caused
interference overlaps(aligns) and therefore uses less signal
dimensions. The resulting interference-free signal dimensions
can be used for communication. IA methods can be di-
vided into two categories, namely the vector-space alignment
approach and the signal-scale alignment approach [7]. The
former uses the classical signalling dimensions time, frequency
and multiple-antennas for the alignment, while the latter uses
the signal strength for alignment. Real interference alignment
and signal-strength deterministic models are examples for
signal-scale alignment. Signal-strength deterministic models
are based on an approximation of the Gaussian channel. An
example for such an approximation is the linear deterministic
model (LDM), introduced by Avestimehr et al. in[8]. It is
based on a binary expansion of the transmit signal, and an
approximation of the channel gain to powers of two. The
resulting binary expansion gets truncated at the noise level
which yields a noise-free binary signal vector and makes the
model deterministic. It has been shown that various Gaussian
channels (i.e. [9], [10], [11], [12]) can be approximated by the
LDM such that the deterministic capacity is within a constant
bit-gap of the Gaussian channel. Moreover, layered lattice
coding schemes can be used to transfer the achievable scheme
to the Gaussian model.
Previous work and Contributions: Previous results on the
multiple access wiretap channel include the sum secure d.o.f.
of K(K−1)K(K−1)+1 for the K-user case in [13]. There, the authors
used a combination of real interference alignment together
with cooperative jamming [14]. The idea is that the users
can allocate a small part of the signalling dimensions with
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Figure 1. The Gaussian multiple access Wiretap channel.
uniform distributed random bits. Those random bits are send
such that they occupy a small space at the legitimate receiver,
while overlapping with the signals at the eavesdropper. The
crypto-lemma shows, that the eavesdropper cannot recover the
signal without knowledge of the random bits, hence securing
communication. The next step is to transition from the d.o.f.
result, to a constant-gap capacity result. In [15] the previously
known 12 d.o.f. result of the wiretap channel with a helper [13]
was extended towards a constant-gap result for certain channel
gains. This was achieved by approximating the problem with
the LDM and then transferring the results to the Gaussian
model. We will use the same strategy for the multiple access
wiretap channel, i.e. restrict the problem to the two user
case and approximate it by the LDM. We develop a novel
communication scheme which achieves the 23 d.o.f. result as
baseline and extends to a generalized s.d.o.f. characterization.
Moreover, we transfer bounding techniques of [13] to the
deterministic setting and extend them towards a general bound,
which also includes asymmetrical channel gains.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel is defined
as a system consisting of two transmitters and two receivers.
Each transmitter i has a channel input Xi which it sends
over the channel to the legitimate receiver Y1, whereas the
eavesdropper Y2 tries to intercept the messages. The channel
itself is modelled with additive white Gaussian noise, Z1, Z2.
The system equations can therefore be written as
Y1 = h11X1 + h21X2 + Z1 (1a)
Y2 = h22X2 + h12X1 + Z2, (1b)
where the channel inputs satisfy an input power constraint
E{|Xi|2} ≤ P for each i. Moreover, the Gaussian noise
terms are assumed to be independent and zero mean with
unit variance, Zi ∼ CN (0, 1). A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code for
the multiple access wiretap channel will consist of a message
pair (W1,W2) uniformly distributed over the message set
[1 : 2nR1 ] × [1 : 2nR2 ] with a decoding and two randomized
encoding functions. Encoder 1 assigns a codeword Xn1 (w1) to
each message w1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ], while the encoder 2 assigns
a codeword Xn2 (w2) to each message w2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ]. The
decoder assigns an estimate (wˆ1, wˆ2) ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ]× [1 : 2nR2 ]
to each observation of Y n1 . A rate is said to be achievable
if there exist a sequence of (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) codes, for which
the probability of error P (n)e = P [(Wˆ1, Wˆ2) 6= (W1,W2)]
goes to zero, as n goes to infinity limn→∞ P
(n)
e = 0. A
message W is said to be information-theoretically secure if
the eavesdropper cannot reconstruct the message W from the
channel observation Y n2 . This means that the uncertainty of
the message is almost equal to its entropy, given the channel
observation. Considering both messages W1,W2, we have that
1
nH(W1,W2|Y n2 ) ≥ 1nH(W1,W2)− , (2)
which leads to I(W1,W2;Y n2 ) ≤ n for any  > 0. A secrecy
rate r is said to be achievable if it is achievable while obeying
the secrecy constraint (2).
A. The Linear Deterministic Model
We investigate the linear deterministic model (LDM) of
the multiple access wiretap channel as simplification of the
corresponding Gaussian model. This approximation models a
signal in the channel as bit-vector X, which is achieved by
a binary expansion of the input signal X . The elements of
the resulting vector are referred to as bit-levels. The addition
of signals is modelled by binary addition. Carry-overs are
neglected and the addition is limited to the specific bit-level.
The resulting bit-vectors get truncating at the noise bit-level,
which yields a deterministic model. Moreover, specific channel
gains shift the bit-vectors for a certain number of bit-levels
with a shift-matrix S, which is defined as
S =

0 0 · · · 0 0
1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · 1 0
 . (3)
The model therefore shifts an incoming bit vector for q − n
positions with Y = Sq−nX, where q := max{n}. Channel
gains are represented by nij-bit levels which corresponds to
dlog SNRe of the original channel. With this definitions, the
system model can be approximated by
Y1 = S
q−n11X′1 ⊕ Sq−n21X′2 (4a)
Y2 = S
q−n22X′2 ⊕ Sq−n12X′1, (4b)
where q := max{n11, n12, n21, n22}. For ease of notation, we
denote X1 = Sq−n11X′1 and X2 = S
q−n21X′2. Furthermore,
we denote Sq−n22X′2 and S
q−n12X′1 by Xˆ2 and Xˆ1, respec-
tively. We also assume that n22 = n12 =: nE , and denote
n1 − n2 =: n∆ with n11 =: n1 and n21 =: n2. We may
assume w.l.o.g. that n1 > n2, where we leave out the case
that n1 = n2, see remark (3). To specify a particular range
of elements in a bit-level vector we use the notation a[i:j] to
indicate that a is restricted to the bit-levels i to j. Bit levels
are counted from top, most significant bit in the expansion, to
bottom. If i = 1, it will be omitted a[:j], the same for j=n
a[i:].
Remark 1. The assumption that n22 = n12 = nE , i.e.
the eavesdropper receives the signals with equal strength,
does not influence the achievable secrecy sum-rate. Consider
a channel with n22 6= n12, for example n22 > n12. The
part of X′2 which is received above n12 at the eavesdropper,
Xˆ2,[:n22−n12], cannot be utilized since it cannot be jammed.
One can therefore achieve the same rate by ignoring the top
n22−n12 bits of X′2. The same argument holds for n12 > n22.
III. MAIN RESULT
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Theorem 1. The achievable secrecy sum-rate Rach of the
linear deterministic multiple access wiretap channel with
symmetric channel gains at the eavesdropper is
Rach =
{
2
3 (b nc3n∆ c3n∆) + np +Q. for n2 ≥ nE
2
3 (b nc3n∆ c3n∆) +Q. for nE > n2,
(5)
where nc = nE + n∆, np = n1 − nc and
Q =

q for nQ < n∆
n∆ for 2n∆ > nQ ≥ n∆
n∆ + q for nQ ≥ 2n∆,
(6)
with nQ = nc − b nc3n∆ c3n∆ and q = nQ − b
nQ
n∆
cn∆.
1) Case 1 (n2 ≥ nE): First of all, we introduce the
common and private parts of the received signal Y1. We count
the bits from the top (most-significant bit) downwards. The
common part will be denoted by Y1,c and consist of the top
nc = nE+n∆ bits of Y1. The remainder, the private part, will
be denoted as Y1,p and has n1−nc := np bits. It only contains
signal parts which are not received by the eavesdropper. Our
strategy is to deploy a cooperative jamming scheme such that
minimal jamming is done to Y1,c, while maximal jamming is
received at Y2. We denote the part of X1 in Y1,c by X1,c.
Moreover, we denote the part of X2 which gets received at
Y2 by X2,c. We partition these common signals into 3n∆-
bit parts and partition these parts again into n∆-bit parts. For
X1,c, in every 3n∆-bit part we use the first n∆ bits for the
message and the next n∆ bits for jamming, while the last n∆
bits will not be used. For X2,c, in every 3n∆-bit part, the first
n∆ bits will be used for jamming. The next n∆ bits will be
used for the message and the last n∆ bits left free. There will
be a reminder part with
nQ = nc − b nc3n∆ c3n∆ bits. (7)
The reminder part follows the same design rules as the 3n∆
parts, until nQ bits are allocated. The scheme is designed such
that the jamming parts of X1,c and X2,c overlap at Y1,c, while
the message parts of one signal overlap with the non-used
part of the other signal. However, due to the signal strength
difference n∆, the jamming parts overlap with the messages
at Y2, see Fig. 2. Secure communication is therefore provided
by the crypto-lemma, as long as we use a Bern( 12 ) distribution
for the jamming bits. The whole private part can be used
for messaging and its sum-rate is therefore rp = np. The
achievable secure rate for the common part consists of the
rate for the 3n∆ partitions and the reminder part. It can be
n∆
3n∆
nQ
Message
Jamming
Y1
X1
X2
Y2
Xˆ1 Xˆ2
nc
np
Y1,c
Figure 2. Illustration of the achievable scheme. The private partY1,p can be
used freely and is, in this case, allocated by User 1. The common part Y1,c
uses our alignment strategy. The strategy exploits the channel gain difference
between both signals, to minimize the effect of jamming at the receiver Y1,
while jamming all signal parts at the eavesdropper Y2.
seen that every 3n∆-part of Y1,c allocates 2n∆ bits for the
messages. This results in the common secrecy rate
rc = (b nc3n∆ c3n∆) 23 +Q, (8)
where Q specifies the rate part of the remainder term. In the
remainder part we allocate all remaining bits as message bits,
as long as nQ < n∆. For 2n∆ > nQ ≥ n∆, we allocate the
first n∆ bits of nQ for the message. And for nQ ≥ 2n∆, we
allocate the first n∆ bits as well as the last q bits, where q is
defined as
q = nQ − bnQn∆ cn∆. (9)
This results in
Q =

q for nQ < n∆
n∆ for 2n∆ > nQ ≥ n∆
n∆ + q for nQ ≥ 2n∆.
(10)
Together with the private rate term, we achieve
R = 23 (b nc3n∆ c3n∆) + np +Q. (11)
2) Case 2 (n2 ≥ nE): The achievable scheme is the same
as in the previous case, except that we do not have a private
part. We therefore have an achievable rate of
R = 23 (b nc3n∆ c3n∆) +Q. (12)
Remark 2. The bit level shift between Y1 and Y2 of n∆
bits makes it impossible to divide Y1 in exclusively private
and common parts. In our division, the bottom n∆ bits of
x1,c are only received at Y1 and therefore private. Hence, the
common rate rc is not purely made of common signal parts.
Nevertheless, our choice of division reaches the upper bound
and fits into the scheme.
Remark 3. Our scheme relies on the signal strength difference
between both users. Our scheme would not work, if n1 = n2,
while having equal channel gains at the eavesdropper. In that
case we would not have any signal strength diversity to exploit
which results in a singularity point where the secrecy rate is
zero.
B. Converse
Theorem 2. The secrecy sum-rate Rach of the linear determin-
istic multiple access wiretap channel with symmetric channel
gains at the eavesdropper is bounded from above by
rUB =
{
2
3nc + np +
1
3n∆ for n2 ≥ nE
2
3nc +
1
3n∆ for nE > n2.
(13)
Proof: We start with some general observations and
derivations before handling the different cases explicitly. We
begin with the following derivations
n(R1 +R2) = H(W1,W2)
= H(W1,W2|Yn1 ) + I(W1,W2;Yn1 )
≤ I(W1,W2;Yn1 ) + n
(a)
≤ I(W1,W2;Yn1 )− I(W1,W2;Yn2 ) + n2
≤ I(W1,W2;Yn1 ,Yn2 )− I(W1,W2;Yn2 ) + n2
≤ I(W1,W2;Yn1 |Yn2 ) + n2
≤ I(Xn1 ,Xn2 ;Yn1 |Yn2 ) + n2
= H(Yn1 |Yn2 )−H(Yn1 |Yn2 ,Xn1 ,Xn2 ) + n2
(b)
= H(Yn1 |Yn2 ) + n2
≤ H(Yn1,c|Yn2 ) +H(Yn1,p|Yn2 ,Yn1,c) + n2(14)
where we used basic techniques such as Fano’s inequality
and the chain rule. Step (a) introduces the secrecy constraint
(2), while we used the chain rule, non-negativity of mutual
information and the data processing inequality in the following
lines. Step (b) follows from the fact that Yn1 is a function of
(Xn1 ,X
n
2 ). Note that due to the definition of the common and
the private part1 of Yn1 , it follows that H(Y
n
1,p|Yn2 ,Yn1,c) = 0
for nE ≥ n2.
We now extend the strategy of [13], of bounding a single
signal part, to asymmetrical channel gains
nR1 = H(W1)
≤ I(W1;Yn1 )− n3
≤ I(Xn1 ;Yn1 )− n3
= I(Xn1 ;Y
n
1,c) + I(X
n
1 ;Y
n
1,p|Yn1,c)− n3
= H(Yn1,c)−H(Yn1,c|Xn1 ) + I(Xn1 ;Yn1,p|Yn1,c)− n3
= H(Yn1,c)−H(Xn2,c) + I(Xn1 ;Yn1,p|Yn1,c)− n3
1The common part is defined as Yn1,c = Y
n
1,[:nc]
, and the private part as
Yn1,p = Y
n
1,[nc+1:]
.
and it therefore holds that
H(Xn2,c) ≤ H(Yn1,c)+I(Xn1 ;Yn1,p|Yn1,c)−n(R1+3). (15)
The same can be shown for H(Xn1,c), where it holds that
H(Xn1,c) ≤ H(Yn1,c)+I(Xn2 ;Yn1,p|Yn1,c)−n(R2+4). (16)
Moreover, we have that
I(Xn1 ;Y
n
1,p|Yn1,c) + I(Xn2 ;Yn1,p|Yn1,c)
= 2H(Yn1,p|Yn1,c)−H(Yn1,p|Yn1,c,Xn1 )−H(Yn1,p|Yn1,c,Xn2 )
= 2H(Yn1,p|Yn1,c)− H(Xn2,p|Yn1,c)−H(Xn1,p|Yn1,c)
= H(Yn1,p|Yn1,c). (17)
The key idea for the various cases is now to bound the term
H(Yn1,c|Yn2 ), or equivalently H(Yn1 |Yn2 ) for nE > n2, in an
appropriate way, to be able to use (15) and (16) on (14). We
start with the first case:
1) Case 1 (n2 ≥ nE): Here we have a none vanishing
private part, due to the definition of Yn1,c and therefore need
to bound the term H(Yn1,c|Yn2 ). Note that due to the definition
of Yn1,c we have that H(X
n
2,c) = H(Xˆ
n
2 ). We look into the
first term of equation (14) and show that
H(Yn1,c|Yn2 ) = H(Yn1,c,Yn2 )−H(Yn2 )
≤ H(Yn1,c, Xˆn1 , Xˆn2 )−H(Yn2 )
= H(Xˆn1 , Xˆ
n
2 ) +H(Y
n
1,c|Xˆn1 , Xˆn2 )−H(Yn2 )
≤ H(Xˆn1 ) +H(Xˆn2 )−H(Yn2 |Xˆn2 )
+H(Yn1,c|Xˆn1 , Xˆn2 )
= H(Xˆn2 ) +H(Y
n
1,c|Xˆn1 , Xˆn2 ). (18)
Observe that the second term of equation (18) is depended on
the specific regime. We can bound this term by
H(Yn1,c|Xˆn1 , Xˆn2 ) ≤ n(nc − nE) = nn∆. (19)
Note that the choice of Xˆn2 in (18) as remaining signal part
was arbitrary due to our assumption that both signals Xˆn1 and
Xˆn2 have the same signal strength. Moreover, it follows on the
same lines that
H(Yn1,c|Yn2 ) ≤ H(Xˆn1 ) + nn∆. (20)
Looking at this result, its intuitive that one can also show the
stronger result
H(Yn1,c|Yn2 ) ≤ H(Xn1,c) (21)
for the case that n2 ≥ nE . This can be shown by considering
a similar strategy as in (18)
H(Yn1,c|Yn2 ) = H(Yn1,c,Yn2 )−H(Yn2 )
≤ H(Yn2 ,Xn1,c,Xn2,c)−H(Yn2 )
= H(Xn1,c,X
n
2,c) +H(Y
n
2 |Xn1,c,Xn2,c)−H(Yn2 )
≤ H(Xn1,c) +H(Xn2,c)−H(Yn2 |Xn1,c)
+H(Yn2 |Xn1,c,Xn2,c)−H(Yn2 )
= H(Xn1,c) +H(Y
n
2 |Xn1,c,Xn2,c), (22)
where
H(Yn2 |Xn1,c,Xn2,c) ≤ (nE − n2)+ = 0. (23)
We combine one sum-rate inequality (14) with (18) and
one with (22). Moreover, we plug (15) and (16) into the
corresponding bound, which yields
n(2R1 +R2 − 6) ≤ H(Yn1,c) + I(Xn2 ;Yn1,p|Yn1,c)
+H(Yn1,p|Yn2 ,Yn1,c)
and
n(R1 + 2R2 − 7) ≤ H(Yn1,c) + I(Xn1 ;Yn1,p|Yn1,c)
+H(Yn1,p|Yn2 ,Yn1,c) + nn∆.
A summation of these results gives
3n(R1 +R2)− n8 ≤ 2H(Yn1,c) + I(Xn1 ;Yn1,p|Yn1,c)
+ I(Xn2 ;Y
n
1,p|Yn1,c) + nn∆
+ 2H(Yn1,p|Yn2 ,Yn1,c).
Using (17), and the fact that H(Yn1,p|Yn2 ,Yn1,c) ≤ nnp and
H(Yn1,p|Yn1,c) ≤ nnp results in
3n(R1 +R2)− n8 ≤ 2H(Yn1,c) + 3nnp + nn∆
≤ 2nnc + 3nnp + nn∆.
Dividing by 3n and letting n→∞ shows the result.
2) Case 2 (nE > n2): First, we assume that nE ≥ n1, and
include a short proof for n1 > nE ≥ n2 at the end of this
subsection. For Case 2, the private part Y1,p is zero, due to
the definition of the private part and nE > n2. It follows that
(14) is
n(R1 +R2) ≤ H(Yn1 |Yn2 ). (24)
Moreover, H(Xn2 ) = H(X
n
2,c) ≤ H(Xˆn2 ), which is why we
need to bound (24) by H(Xn2 ) and H(X
n
1 ). We therefore
modify (22) to fit our purpose in the following way
H(Yn1 |Yn2 ) = H(Yn1 ,Yn2 )−H(Yn2 )
≤ H(Xn1 ,Xn2 ) +H(Yn2 |Xn1 ,Xn2 )−H(Yn2 )
= H(Xn1 ,X
n
2 ) +H(Y
n
2,c|Xn1 ,Xn2 )
+H(Yn2,p|Xn1 ,Xn2 ,Yn2,c)
−H(Yn2,c)−H(Yn2,p|Yn2,c)
≤ H(Xn1 ,Xn2 ) +H(Yn2,c|Xn1 ,Xn2 )−H(Yn2,c),
where Yn2,c = Y
n
2,[:n1]
and Yn2,p = Y
n
2,[n1+1:]
. Now, we can
show that
H(Yn1 |Yn2 ) ≤ H(Xn1 ,Xn2 ) +H(Yn2,c|Xn1 ,Xn2 )−H(Yn2,c)
= H(Xn1 ,X
n
2 ) +H(Xˆ
n
2 |Xn2 )−H(Yn2,c)
≤ H(Xn1 ) +H(Xn2 )−H(Yn2,c|Xn2 )
+H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 )
= H(Xn2 ) +H(Xˆ
n
2 |Xn2 )
≤ H(Xn2 ) + nn∆. (25)
Bounding H(Yn1 |Yn2 ) by H(Xn1 ) requires more work. We
have a redundancy in the negative entropy terms, with which
we can cancel the H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 ) term in the following way
H(Yn1 |Yn2 ) ≤ H(Xn1 ,Xn2 ) +H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 )−H(Yn2,c)
≤ H(Xn1 ) +H(Xn2 )−H(Yn2,c,[:n2]|Xn1 )
+H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 )−H(Yn2,c,[n2+1:]|Xn1 ,Yn2,c,[:n2])
= H(Xn1 )−H(Yn2,c,[n2+1:]|Xn1 ,Yn2,c,[:n2])
+H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 )
≤ H(Xn1 )−H(Yn2,c,[n2+1:]|Xn1 ,Yn2,c,[:n2],Xn2 )
+H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 )
= H(Xn1 )−H(Yn2,c,[n2+1:]|Xn1 ,Xn2 )
+H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 )
= H(Xn1 )−H(Xˆn2,c,[n2+1:]|Xn2 ) +H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 )
= H(Xn1 ). (26)
Now we can bound one (24) with (25) and one with (26).
Moreover, we use (15) and (16) on the result. Note that due
to our regime, (15) becomes
H(Xn2 ) ≤ H(Yn1 )− n(R1 + 3), (27)
while (16) becomes
H(Xn1 ) ≤ H(Yn1 )− n(R2 + 4). (28)
Putting everything together results in
3n(R1 +R2)− n8 ≤ 2H(Yn1 ) + nn∆
≤ 2nnc + nn∆.
Dividing by 3n and letting n→∞ shows the result.
We need to modify a bound on H(Yn1 |Yn2 ), if the signal
strength nE lies in between n1 and n2. In (25), we see that
H(Xn1 )−H(Yn2,c|Xn2 ) ≤ n(n1 − nE)+. (29)
Moreover, we have that H(Xˆn2 |Xn2 ) ≤ n(nE − n2)+. Both
changes cancel and we get the same result as (25). The result
follows on the same lines as in the previous derivation.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Discussion of the Results
We have approximated the Gaussian multiple access wiretap
channel with the linear deterministic model. This enables a
simplified look at the model with an emphasis on the role
of channels gains in the secrecy sum-rate analysis. We used
a signal-scale alignment approach to provide information-
theoretic security. Our approach distinguishes between channel
gain differences which is reflected in the achievable sum-
rate. Our results agree with previous s.d.o.f. results, as our
secrecy sum-rate approaches the s.d.o.f. asymptotically for
n∆ → 0 and nE ≥ min{n2, n1}, i.e. without channel gain
difference between users and without private part, see Fig. 3.
Moreover, we have shown upper bounds which are tight for
certain n∆ ranges. We note that the achievable sum-rate varies
between being above and below the 23 threshold. An interesting
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Figure 3. The graphic shows the achievable secrecy rate, normalized by the
strongest signal nmax = max{n1, n2}, in blue. Moreover, it shows the upper
bound rUB in green. The regime is nE > min{n1, n2}, which results in
the private rate being zero. The x-axis visualizes the fraction α = n2
n1
. At
α = 0, there is no penalty in utilizing X2 for jamming, and nmax bits can
be achieved. For α → 1, the difference between X1 and X2 gets smaller
and the rate approaches the s.d.o.f of 2
3
nmax. For 1 < α ≤ ∞, X′2 gets
stronger than X′1. Interchanging the roles of both users in the scheme results
in a mirror-symmetric behaviour. We also show a red curve for 2
3
n1+n2
2
.
question is, to which channel gain the 23 d.o.f. refer to. The
best d.o.f. representation in our scheme is 23 of
n1+n2
2 , which
is represented in the red curve in Fig. 3.
B. Future Research Directions
We think that the results of this paper are important for
a constant-gap sum-capacity analysis of the Gaussian wiretap
channel. The achievable scheme can be translated to the Gaus-
sian equivalent by using layered lattices codes. The signals
have to be partitioned into n∆ intervals, where every partition
represents a single-link using one lattice code. Moreover, our
upper bounds guide the design of smart genies for the Gaussian
channel. We expect that the techniques of [13] together with
smart genies, which partition the terms accordingly, will result
in bounds which lead to a constant-gap result for the Gaussian
multiple access wiretap channel.
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